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The 2020 Twitter Hack – So Many Lessons to Be Learned
Abstract
In mid-July 2020, the social media site Twitter had over 100 of its most prominent user accounts start to
tweet requests to send Bitcoin to specified Bitcoin wallets. The requests promised that the Bitcoin
senders would receive their money back doubled, as a gesture of charity amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
The attack appears to have been carried out by a small group of hackers, leveraging social engineering to
get access to internal Twitter support tools. These tools allowed the hackers to gain full control of the
high-profile user accounts and post messages on their behalf. The attack provides many paths for
investigation into the prevention, response, and impacts of cybersecurity breaches.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper is written as a teaching case study for use in a cybersecurity course,
either in an introductory course, or possibly a course in digital forensics. It is aimed
at the student, with a separate instructor document available to provide teaching
guidance. As such, it deliberately avoids answering questions and directly
providing the lessons learned, but rather provides sample questions for faculty to
consider using in their discussion of the case with their students. The paper also
provides overview information on this particular security incident as background
for the discussions. This information largely came at the time from the popular
press, though much later in 2020 there was a regulatory report published by the
New York Department of Financial Services (2020).

BACKGROUND
Twitter is a “microblogging” social media service, allowing users to post short text
messages, pictures, and links to video and other content. It is used by millions of
people and organizations – to broadcast news, to keep in touch, to stir public
opinion, and otherwise engage with groups of “followers”. Like most young tech
companies (Cereola and Dynowska, 2019; Jacobson and O'Rourke, 2020), Twitter
has had its share of security incidents of one kind or another – some from inside,
some from outside.
This case took place most visibly in July 2020 and appears to be an attack
utilizing Twitter as a way to try to steal money. The case is drawn from publicly
available documentation and reflects the facts of the case as publicly reported and
available at the time of writing. All claims of criminal activity are only allegations
at this time, as the criminal cases have not been decided in court.
A large share of the impacted accounts represented public figures in the US –
industry leaders, politicians, and entertainers. Some companies’ Twitter accounts
were affected, including Bitcoin exchanges and technology companies.
Interestingly, one account that had its Twitter direct messages downloaded
belonged to a Dutch politician – one of the few non-US-based people who were
impacted (Sandler, 2020).
Social engineering is a hacking approach to fool victims into performing
actions which would compromise confidential information or systems. Phishing
and spear-phishing are two types of social engineering attacks. Phishing utilizes
emails which falsely claim to be sent from legitimate, trusted sources. Phishing
emails are sent broadly and rely upon careless recipients to click hostile embedded
links which lead to compromise of the end user’s system or sensitive information.
Like phishing, spear-phishing emails contain messages and links to compromise
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the recipient’s data or system but are not distributed broadly. They are targeted at
specific high-value individuals and are carefully crafted to contain detailed,
believable information intended to convince the recipient to perform an action
which would result in the compromise of the recipient’s data or systems. Finally,
phone spear phishing uses voice calls instead of e-mail to achieve the same goals
(Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, and Weippl, 2015).

EVENTS OF THE CASE
The Events of July 15
The first messages related to the scam came from short-named Twitter accounts,
such as @6. These had been taken over by the hackers to demonstrate their broad
ability to control parts of Twitter’s systems. Then, messages appeared from Twitter
accounts owned by Bitcoin trading companies, such as Coinbase. Finally, the
primary scam messages appeared from many high-profile accounts.
The hack first became broadly public on July 15, when between 1 and 3 p.m.
Pacific Time (PT), about 130 high-profile Twitter accounts were compromised to
generate traffic for a Bitcoin scam (Bloomberg, 2020). The scam messages (tweets)
offered readers the opportunity to “double their money” as an act of charity by the
Twitter account owner. All the reader had to do was send Bitcoin (in any amount)
to a specified Bitcoin wallet, and the Bitcoin would be doubled and returned to the
reader. See examples of these tweets in Appendix A.
Within a very short time, reportedly over 300 deposits totaling over
US$118,000 had been deposited to one of the Bitcoin wallets (see Figure 1, below,
for an overview of the information and funds flows). It is not certain whether any
or all of that money came from scam victims (Twitter readers), as sometimes
hackers will “seed” the target account so that early victims see that others are
believing the scam as well (Roberts, 2020). In those same early minutes, about
US$61,000 was removed from the wallet through a series of transactions, likely
meant to hide the hackers’ identities. Most of the added funds came from wallets
with apparently Chinese ownership, though about 25% came from US-owned
wallets (Isaac, Frenkel, and Conger, 2020).
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Figure 1 – Overview of scam activity

Twitter soon became aware of the scam and took steps to stop the attack. They
deleted the scam messages as they were discovered. Consistent wording in the scam
messages made it easier to find such messages across the many affected accounts.
The same phrase was reportedly used in over 3,000 tweets within a four-hour
period. The tweets appeared to have originated from at least six countries
(Bloomberg, 2020). This of course means that the compromised accounts were used
to post messages repeatedly, even after Twitter started deleting the scam messages.
The messages were shown on Twitter as having been posted by a user on the Twitter
web page, rather than the Twitter app.
Twitter recognized that attackers had gained control of the many accounts and
took steps to restrict access to them – preventing those accounts from tweeting new
content and changing their password. Twitter also recognized that their
administrative tools had been compromised and implemented tighter controls
around access to those tools for their administrators.
Other companies also were active in mitigating the damage from the scam. For
example, Coinbase, a Bitcoin trading company, blocked access to the identified
Bitcoin wallets, preventing future victims from depositing their Bitcoin there. It is
not known how much Twitter and Coinbase (and other Bitcoin traders) were able
or willing to coordinate their efforts (Cimpanu, 2020).
By 2:45 p.m. on July 15, Twitter posted a notice that they were “aware of a
security incident impacting accounts on Twitter” and that they were actively
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engaged in fixing it. Twitter also temporarily disabled at least some of the accounts
from being able to tweet original content (they could still retweet) or reset their
passwords.

May through July
The day before the hack became public, July 14, the hackers appear to have
discussed the capabilities they had acquired through their access to internal Twitter
tools (Popper and Conger, 2020). The hackers claimed to have gotten access to
Twitter account support tools, used by Twitter staff to resolve problems for clients
(see Appendix B), and reportedly offered to create or take control of desirable
Twitter user names, for a fee of up to US$1,500.
The actual break-in allegedly started around May 3, according to arrest records
(Cimpanu, 2020). Details are sketchy, but presumably this is the start of the first
part of the social engineering attack. The hackers made use of phone-based social
engineering to try to get Twitter employee login credentials. They were first able
to compromise login information for lower-level employees who did not have
access to the administrative tools. Subsequent efforts, based on those first
credentials, allowed the hackers to reach and compromise individuals who had the
required access to the administrative tool (Goodin, 2020).
Social engineering was reportedly somewhat easier due to the additional
challenge of most Twitter employees working from home (Sarginson, 2020). As
one example salient to this case, employees often used mobile phones in their
remote workplaces, and might then receive calls from numbers other than “internal”
phone extensions, including from phishing actors impersonating IT employees.
This could have the effect of lowering their guard against potential phone-based
phishing attacks.
The hackers are reported to have found access to internal Twitter
documentation on the Slack collaboration tool (Popper and Conger, 2020), perhaps
using the earlier sets of credentials they were able to obtain. Twitter’s Slack
channels appear to have contained documentation with information about remote
access to Twitter’s network, as well as credentials for the administration tools.
Access to these service tools reportedly was limited to about 1,500 Twitter
employees, out of a total of about 4,600 employees. Access to the tool from outside
a Twitter building also reportedly required virtual private network (VPN) access
plus specific authorizations on the login credentials. The service tools allowed the
tool user to, among other things, reset Twitter user account e-mail addresses, which
then allowed unauthorized users to change their passwords.
Given this capability, this was a hack not of a particular account or user, but
rather of the entire service (Schneier, 2020). It appears that nearly any Twitter user
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account could have been compromised, and the hackers chose the accounts they did
likely due to their ability to reach a large audience with their requests for Bitcoin.
While the phone spear phishing attack vector is now generally accepted, there
was early speculation that a Twitter employee may have sold access to the tools to
the hackers. This theory was fed by one of the hackers who claimed to be a Twitter
employee while trying to sell Twitter account access (Popper and Conger, 2020).
In addition to the posting of scam tweets, the hackers are reported to have
downloaded the full Twitter private message archives for eight users, and
“accessed” the private messages of 36 additional users. Unlike tweets, private
messages are just that – private. As such, the damage from this part of the hack may
be yet to come.

The First Part of the Aftermath
This section addresses the activities of law enforcement, Twitter, and other parties,
following detection and shutdown of the hackers’ activities. Following this section
are discussion and research questions intended to help students uncover the lessons
that can be learned from the Twitter hack of July 2020.
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was engaged early in the
investigation, since the scam victims were potentially in many parts of the US, as
well as other countries. Three people were arrested on July 31, just a little over two
weeks after the hack became public. Charges included money laundering, wire
fraud, identity theft, and unauthorized computer access.
There is certainly more of the story yet to come, both in terms of criminal
investigations and in terms of corporate and hacker learning. Further reporting on
the story revealed reported lags in implementing automated security monitoring and
controls, the challenges of restarting operations after an administrative breach, and
the pending criminal trials and other legal actions (Thompson and Barrett, 2020).
Regulatory agencies have conducted analyses of the events and the recommended
responses, including cybersecurity best practices and proposed regulation of social
media companies (New York Department of Financial Services, 2020).

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
Each of the following questions is intended to provoke thinking about one or more
aspects of the situation. They may require research into best practices in
cybersecurity to address the questions. We encourage you to think about each of
these in preparation for an in-depth discussion.
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Internal Controls
•
•

Since it appears that the hack leveraged powerful customer service tools,
what are some examples of the best practices Twitter could have used to
catch this problem earlier?
What type of tools should be in place today to help Twitter understand, alert
on, and conduct after-action research on attacks such as this one?

Social Engineering
•
•

What steps can Twitter take to prevent future attacks?
Was this attack a result of a people issue, a technology issue, or some of
both?

Process Documentation
•

•

It was reported that the hackers found some of their insights from internal
Twitter documentation stored on the independent collaboration tool, Slack
(slack.com). What risks do organizations take by storing sensitive corporate
data on third-party services? What risks do they potentially avoid?
What authentication tools and options does Slack provide, beyond simple
user ID and password?

Third Party Contractors
•
•
•

Twitter, like many large companies, uses third party contract companies to
employ people to handle some customer service queries. What are the pros
and cons to this type of decision?
Why are contract employees likely less invested in Twitter’s mission than
Twitter employees?
How could the relationship with contract employees be managed to
strengthen that investment?

Public Relations
•
•

•

What do you think the impact of this incident has been on public confidence
in the Twitter platform? In social media more broadly?
What challenges do you see happening in this case in managing public
messaging about security incidents – e.g., counts of impacted users, types
of impacts, etc.? What could Twitter have done better? What did they do
well?
Review Twitter’s public communications – what are the tradeoffs (e.g.,
value and risk) of openness?
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Consequences for the Company and Industry
•
•

What implications does this hack have beyond the initial financial impacts?
Consider consumer confidence, politics, organizational credibility, etc.
What are the implications beyond Twitter? Are other social media services
or technology providers impacted in any way? How?

Regulatory Investigations
•
•
•

If you were a government regulator in a country or region of your choice,
what questions would you have for Twitter’s management?
What additional regulatory controls might be appropriate to prevent or
reduce the risk of a recurrence?
What other industries might provide a model for this regulatory oversight?
What are some pros and cons to this regulation?

The Funding Scam
•
•
•

Why did the hackers use multiple Bitcoin wallets?
Why did the scam messages frequently indicate a limit to how much time
or total funding was allowed for the match?
Why did their messages relate the “offer” to the COVID-19 pandemic?

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH IDEAS
The following provide some opportunities for deeper study of the issues.

Study of Company Culture
•
•
•

Based on publicly available information, what can you infer about Twitter’s
company culture?
How would you assess Twitter’s prioritization of security vs. product and
revenue?
If you were Twitter’s CEO, how would you go about making decisions
about cybersecurity investments, especially when they compete with other
investments in your products?

Similar Hack of Reddit in August 2020
•

The Reddit discussion boards suffered what on the surface appears to be a
similar type of hack. Each “subreddit” (a focused discussion area) has one
or more moderators who manage the conversations there. Numerous
subreddit moderators had their credentials compromised in early August,
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•
•
•

with the subreddit content being defaced with political messages (Reddit,
2020).
How does this attack compare and contrast with the Twitter hack?
How do you assess Reddit’s public response vs. Twitter’s public response?
Is there something about small companies that grow quickly that makes
incidents like this possible?

CONCLUSIONS
The 2020 Twitter hack has been a painful lesson in the need for constant vigilance
by employees and security teams, and in the risks of making powerful tools broadly
available within an organization. It has also been a lesson in some of the risks of
the remote workforce, as well as sharing documentation via cloud-based services
that may be insufficiently secured.
The repercussions will certainly be felt across Twitter and other companies for
some time. If we are wise, we can incorporate those lessons learned into many more
organizations (Krebs, 2020).
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APPENDIX A

Source: Investopedia
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APPENDIX B

Source: Wikipedia
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